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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION:
CONCURRENT EMPLOYMENT AND
DETERMINATION OF THE
"AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE"
I. INTRODUCTION
Workmen's Compensation statutes generally provide that
the "average weekly wage" shall be the basic unit by which
benefits are measured. 1 The South Carolina statute follows
this approach, using the "average weekly wage" as the basis
for determining compensation in both total and partial disability cases. 2 To the "average weekly wage" there is typically
applied a fixed statutory percentage in order to determine the
amount of weekly benefits which will be paid. 3 In South Carolina a totally disabled employee will receive "a weekly compensation equal to sixty percent of his average weekly wages,
but not more than fifty dollars, nor less than five dollars a
week . . . . "4 A partially disabled worker will receive "a
weekly compensation equal to sixty percent of the difference
between his average weekly wages before the injury and the
average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter, but
not more than fifty dollars a week...."5
This note will deal with the problem of determining the
"average weekly wage" in the situation where the injured
employee is engaged in two employments at the time of his
injury. The general rule covering this situation is as follows:
Under or apart from statutes so providing, where an employee
works for several employers at the same time, or at different times
under concurrent contracts of employment, his earnings may be taken
as though all the services were performed for the employer in whose
service he was injured, the total earnings being considered in computing a basis for compensation payments, even though the employment
in which he was injured was a full-time, year-round employment. At
least this is so as to earnings where the employments are the same or
similar for each of the employers, although the rule does not apply to
earnings from dual and dissimilar employments. 6
1. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §60.00 (1961).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. §§72-151 through 72-153 (Supp. 1970).
3. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §60.11 (1961).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §72-151 (Supp. 1970).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. §72-152 (Supp. 1970).

6. 99 C.J.S. Workinen's Compensation §294 (d) (1955)
omitted).

(footnotes
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It shall be the purpose of this paper to examine the development of this rule in several jurisdictions and to question the
validity of the distinction drawn for compensation purposes
between concurrent similar and concurrent dissimilar employments.
This area should be of particular interest in South Carolina due to the uncertainty created by the case of McCummings
v. Anderson Theatre Co.7 The injured employee in this case
earned an average of $55 to $60 per week as a bricklayer and
earned an additional $6 per week working one day a week as
a relief projectionist and carpenter for the Anderson Theatre
Company. The employee was injured while on the job with
the theatre company, but the South Carolina Supreme Court,
affirming a lower court's decision, allowed the average wages
from the obviously dissimilar bricklaying employment to be
combined with the earnings from the theatre for the determination of the average weekly wages.8 In doing so, however,
the court stated that "such is not to be considered as a precedent for the purpose of computing an employee's average
weekly wages within the contemplation of the Workmen's
Compensation Act,." 9

II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "CONCURRENT SIMILAR
EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE"

Due to statutory 'differences from state to state, the
development of the rule which distinguishes between concurrent similar and concurrent dissimilar employment has also
varied from state to state. The development of this rule in
New York is particularly interesting. New York's workmen's
compensation statute does not explicitly answer the question
of when, if ever, the wages received from a concurrent employment should be combined with those from the employment
7. 225 S.C. 187, 81 S.E2d 348 (1954).
8. The method of determining the "average weekly wages" under the
South Carolina act is found in S.C. CoDE ANN. §72-4 (Supp. 1970). The
decision in the Anderson Theatre case is based on the second paragraph of this
section which states:
But when for exceptional reasons the foregoing would be unfair,
either to the employer or employee, such other method of computing average weekly wages may be resorted to as will most
nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee
would be earning were it not for the injury.
9. 225 S.C. 187, 194, 81 S.E2d 348, 350 (1954).
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in which the injury occurred for the purpose of computing
the average weekly wage.1 0
The line of New York cases which fashioned that jurisdiction's law on this question began in 1936 with Moochier
v. A. H. Herrick & Son.," In this case the deceased had worked
as a night watchman for seventeen different employers, receiving $10 per week from A. H. Herrick & Son, on whose
premises he was injured, and a total of $12.25 per week from
the other sixteen employers. In its per curiam opinion affirming the Industrial Board's finding that the average weekly
wage was $22.25, the court found that the deceased was not
an independent contractor, but placed no emphasis on the
similarity of his employments.
In 1938, the Court of Appeals of New York, in the case of
McDowell v. Flatbush Congregational Church,' 2 affirmed an
order of the Appellate Division allowing the claimant's wages
as a high school dietician to be combined with the wages she
received as "assistant housekeeper" at her church, in which
capacity she was injured. In her capacity as "assistant housekeeper" the claimant had the responsibility of arranging a
number of dinners for various church organizations. Here
again, however, there was no emphasis placed on the similarity
of the employments in either the opinion of the Appellate
Division or the opinion of the Court of Appeals. It would
appear to be a reasonable conclusion that both the Moochler
and the McDowell cases were based more on sympathy for the
claimant than any logical legal theory.
The 1939 case of Birch v. Budd 3 is interesting in that it
is the first New York case to put any emphasis on the similardissimilar distinction. In this case the Appellate Division held
that the earnings which the deceased received from his job
as a barber could not be considered in computing his average
weekly wage since his fatal injury was received while he was
acting in his capacity as an apartment house janitor. The
court, referring to the state workmen's compensation law
stated:
10. N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENsATION LAW §§ 14, 15 (McKinney 1971).

11. 247 App. Div. 841, 286 N.Y.S. 397, aff'd per curiain 272 N.Y. 545, 4
N.E.2d 729 (1936).
12. 252 App. Div. 799, 298 N.Y.S. 892 (1937), aff'd per curian 277 N.Y.
536, 13 N.E.2d 462 (1938).
13. 256 App. Div. 53, 8 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1939), leave to appeal deied 280
N.Y. 850, 21 N.E.2d 219 (1939).
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The entire scheme of the statute limits the employee's average
weekly wages, and the consequent compensation or death benefit rate,
to earnings in the employment in which the employee is working at
the time of the accident. It is only under subd. 3 that the State Industrial Board may consider earnings in any employment other than the
specific one in which the workman is injured, and then it may consider them only for the purpose of finding a sum which shall reasonably
represent the annual earning capacity of the injured employee in the
specific employment in which he is working when injured.
There have been two cases in the Court of Appeals in which the
employee's earnings from more than one employer were considered in
determining his average weekly wages. . . . However, the nature of
the employment was in each instance the same.1 4

The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal in this case.,;
It appears that the lower court did not really think that
earnings should be combined in any situation, and that the
reference to the similarity of employment in the two Court of
Appeals cases was merely an attempt by the court to distinguish the case at hand in order to prevent being overruled.
The formulation of the rule emphasizing the similardissimilar distinction was apparently finalized in the case of

Brandfon v. Beacon Theatre Corporation.16 Here the court,
not allowing the combination of wages, stated:
In order to arrive at claimant's reduced earnings, it was of course
essential to consider both his weekly average wage at the time of the
accident and his earnings thereafter. As noted, the Board fixed the
average weekly wage solely on the basis of his employment as electrician, without regard to his earnings as projectionist. That was
correct since the employments were dissimilar...
...
While superficially it might appear that the employee's earnings from any and all sources must be taken into account, more careful
study, as well as a regard for the context and design of the statute,
makes it evident that it does not apply or relate to a case in which an
employee was engaged, prior to the accident, in dual and dissimilar
17
employments ....

The illogic of the similar-dissimilar distinction which New

York emphasizes seems to reach a peak in the 1961 case of
Smith v. Jones.18 Here the court allowed the combination of
14. Id. at 56-57, 8 N.Y.S2d at 784-85 (emphasis added).
15. 256 App. Div. 53, 8 N.Y.S2d 781 (1939), leave to appeal denied 280
N.Y. 850, 21 N.E.2d 219 (1939).
16. 300 N.Y. 111, 89 N.E.2d 617 (1949).
17. Id. at 114, 89 N.E.2d at 618 (emphasis added).
18. 12 App. Div. 2d 833, 209 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1961).
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wages. The claimant earned $10 per week working as a maid
for the employer-appellant and earned another $40 per week
working as a maid for a beauty shop. The court put emphasis
on the claimant's testimony describing her duties at the beauty
parlor as "'Cleaning. I waited on the customers. Put them
under the dryers. Clean the mirrors and keep the bathrooms
and served lunches, and things like that. That was all.' "19
Presumably the court would not have allowed the combination
of the wages if the claimant had worked as a beautician at the
beauty parlor rather than as a maid.
It does not appear that the New York courts have at any
time set out any logical reasoning for their statutory interpretation creating the similar-dissimilar distinction. The distinction seems, however, to have developed as a result of sympathy
in a few early cases, and a closer reading of the statute in
some later cases.
The Florida courts have also been confronted with a
workmen's compensation statute which does not specifically
answer the question as to when, if ever, wages from concurrent employment should be combined. 20 In the case of J. J.
Murphy & Son, Inc. v. Gibbs,21 the Florida court, referring to
the determination of the average weekly wage, interpreted
FLA. CODE ANN. § 440.-14 (1)22 to mean that "only wages received by an employee for performance of the same or similar
services during the prescribed period may be combined ....- 23
In making this statutory interpretation, the court went
into the basic question of who should bear the burden of
meeting the economic loss caused by an employee's injury:
As has been pointed out many times workmen's compensation
legislation is designed to relieve society generally, and injured employees specifically, of the economic burden resulting from work connected injuries and place the burden on industry. The Florida act
places this responsibility on the employer for whom the injured employee was working at the time of the injury. Thus, the burden is
19. Id. at 834, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
20. FLA. STATUTES ANN. §440.14 (Supp. 1971-72).

21. 137 So. Zd 553 (Fla. 1962).
22. (1) If the injured employee shall have worked in the employment in
which he was working at the time of the injury, whether for the same or another employer, during substantially the whole of thirteen weeks immediately
preceding the injury, his average weekly wage shall be one-thirteenth of the
total amount of wages earned in such employment during the said thirteen
weeks.

23. 137 So. 2d 553, 559 (Fla. 1962).
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not shifted to industry generally but rather to the specific segment
of industry which caused the injury.
Therefore it seems reasonable that the legislature, having placed
the burden of meeting the economic loss caused by the injury on a
specific segment of industry, would logically have restricted the determination of the amount of the loss to the wages earned by an injured
employee in that segment of industry in which the employee was working at the time of the injury. However, since industry for the purposes
of this discussion may be classified either according to what it produces
or according to the services rendered by the injured employee, we think
it necessary to point out that unless it be classified according to the type
or nature of the services rendered by the injured employee the interpretation given the statute here would be unfavorable to the employee
and would not fully accomplish the obvious purpose of the act, which
is compensate the injured worker, in part, for loss of future earnings.
Therefore it seems to us that in determining whether wages from
several employments may be combined in arriving at an average weekly
wage the prime factor is the sameness or similarity of the work performed by the employee rather than the thing done or produced by the
24
employer, although the latter factor may also be considered.

This reasoning appears to be at best questionable. Its results

would undoubtedly be fair to the employee in some circumstances, but it can hardly be classified as fair in the situation

where compensation is severely restricted because the employee happens to perform different tasks in his two jobs.
Within one year of the Murphy decision, the Florida
Supreme Court, in Central Welding & Iron Works v. Ren.
ton,25 again faced the question of whether wages earned in
two jobs should be combined. Although the court did not
recede from the position it took in Murphy, it did display a

greater awareness of the possible injustices which that position might allow:
It may occur to a reader that a conclusion that the earnings from
diverse employments may not be consolidated to fix the amount of
benefits works unfairness to the workman because he is compensated
disproportionately to his personal loss. But the opposite position is not
without merit for as Mr. Larson observes ". . . It can be argued that
it is unfair to one employer, his carrier and his industry to burden
them with a liability, out of proportion to [the] payroll and premium
computed thereon, arising from a risk not associated with his type of
employment." This distinction becomes exceedingly dim when differentiating between occupations similar and dissimilar for in either event
the same inequality would be present. Pursuing the subject Mr. Larson
concludes that the objection must spring from the thought that one
24. Id. at 558-59.
25. 145 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1962).
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industry should not carry the burden of injury to a person concurrently
engaged in another industry.
We are not unaware of the hardship that would result were a
workman, who had been forced to follow two unlike vocations in order
to provide for his family, so injured in one of them that his income
in the one would be greatly reduced, while the income from the other
26
would be entirely lost.

The court concluded that they could only construe the statute
as they thought the legislature intended for it to be construed,
and that "unsatisfactory treatment" could be eliminated by
2
legislative action. T
In the case of St. PauZ-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Idov, 28
the Georgia Court of Appeals allowed the combination of
wages in determining the average weekly wage where the
employee was engaged in two jobs as a retail liquor salesman
and a third job as a retail clothing salesman. 29 The court
emphasized the fact that the employee's duties were the same
in all three jobs, i.e., "to sell items at retail to customers." 30
The court went on to say:
..
There is nothing connected with a clothing store which would make
it a more hazardous occupation than that of selling liquor, so far as
appears from the record. The employee may therefore be said to have
been steadily and concurrently engaged in three jobs, the total of
which represented one employment, that of retail salesman, and the
sum of his salaries in these three positions constituted his average
weekly wages and established his total earning capacity at that time. 31

Although the court was not faced directly with the concurrent dissimilar employment question, they did state:
26. 145 So. 2d 876, 877 (Fla. 1962), quoting from

LARsoN, WoRaKMEN's

COMPENSATION LAW §60.31

(1961)
(emphasis added). Assuming that Mr.
Larson's use of the word industry is a reference to employers, his conclusion
does not seem to be a valid justification for Florida's policy since the court,
in the Murphy case, stated that the relevant similarity was the similarity of
jobs performed rather than the similarity of the employers' businesses. 137
So. 2d 553, 559 (Fla. 1962).
27. 145 So. 2d 876, 877 (Fla. 1962).
28. 88 Ga. App. 697, 77 S.E.2d 327 (1953), writ of cert. disnissed 210 Ga.
256, 78 S.E.2d 799 (1953).
29. The Georgia workmen's compensation statute does not specifically set
forth when, if ever, wages from concurrent employment should be combined.
See GA. CODE ANw. §114-402 (1).

30. 88 Ga. App. 697, 698, 77 S.E.2d 327, 329 (1953).
31. Id. What difference does itmake how dangerous the other job was?
i.e. Had the employee's other job been a great deal more dangerous, and had
the employee been injured on such other job, the other employer would be the
one liable for the compensation.
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The concurrent similar employment doctrine is applied only where
the accident arises out of and in the course of the employment while
the employee is engaged for an employer subject to the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his concurrent work must be
similar in character to the work in the course of which the accident
32
was sustained.

Although the result in this case was fair to the particular
claimant involved, the doctrine set forth led to a somewhat

less than fair result in the 1970 case of Black V. American &
Foreign Insurance Company.3 3 In the Black case, the em-

ployee was injured in his part-time employment as a courier
which the court determined was not similar to his full-time
job as a supervisor in the finishing department of a printing

firm. Thus, the court, relying on the "concurrent similar employment doctrine" set forth in the Idov case, upheld an award
basing the claimant's compensation on his part-time wages
without regard to his wages from his "dissimilar" full-time

job. Three judges dissented in this case and Presiding Judge
Hall, concurring only out of deference to the doctrine of stare

decisis, advocated the abolition of the "concurrent similar
employment doctrine," but felt that such action could only

be taken by the legislature. 34 Presiding Judge Hall stated:
I agree with the view.., that the fact that one industry may ultimately
be harmed by being required to bear part of the burden of an injury
produced by another "is so remote and theoretical that it hardly seems
to offset the very real injustice of relegating a disabled man accustomed
to full earnings to a benefit level below that of destitution because of
the circumstances that he happened to earn his living in two 'dis35
similar' jobs."

Presiding Judge Jordan, dissenting, advocated the overruling of so much of the Idov case as requires concurrent

employment to be similar, and adopted the opinion of the
trial judge, which recommended that Georgia adopt a doctrine

of "concurrent employment" as opposed to the doctrine of

"concurrent similar employment". This opinion, in recogniz-

ing the difficulties in determining when employment is "similar," pointed out that there are almost always some similar-

ities as well as some dissimilarities in concurrent employment,
and stated that concurrence and the knowledge of concurrence
32.
33.
34.
35.

88 Ga. App. 697, 700-01, 77 S.E.2d 327, 330 (1953) (emphasis added).
123 Ga. App. 133, 179 S.E.2d 679 (1970).
Id.
Id., quoting from LARSoN, WoaxmFN's COMP-NSATION LAW §60.31.
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by all employers is all that should be necessary.3 6 The opinion
emphasized the theory of workmen's compensation:
The theory of Georgia 'Workmen's (sic] Compensation law is to compensate the employee based on his earning capacity. As stated so
succinctly in the above cited case, '.... The one high aim constituting
the foundation of this law is compensation for an injured employee,
in proportion to his loss on account of injury. . . We think the
fairest yardstick by which his compensation to cover his injury can be
measured is what he was able to earn and was actually earning when
the misfortune came upon him.... It cannot be doubted that, at the
time of his death, this employee's earning capacity was the total of his
wages from the three jobs he was doing . . . rather than the wage
received from part-time employment .... Where an employee is work-

ing for several different employers and is injured, in order that he
may be reasonably compensated for the loss of his earning powers,
his total wages must be taken into consideration. Any other construction of the statute would result in great injustice and lead to absurdi37
ties.'

The dissenting opinion of Judge Deen advocated a theory
of "similar employment" based on similarity of risk or hazard

rather than similarity of duties. While this theory might
prevent some injustices, it would still allow inadequate compensation in a number of other situations, and the logic on
which it is based is at best questionable.38
The development of the law of Arizona on the point

under discussion is interesting, but in the opinion of this
writer it is not very encouraging. In the 1945 case of Wells
v. Industrial Commission, 39 the Arizona court allowed the

combination of wages where the claimant worked full-time
as a salesman and part-time as a painter. The court stated:
"[S]ince the act is wholly remedial, it should be given a liberal
construction to accomplish the purpose intended. . .
Where an employee is working for several different employers and
is injured, in order that he may be reasonably compensated for the loss
of his earning power, his total wages must be taken into consideration.
Any other construction of the statute would result in great injustice
and lead to absurdities....
. . .In answer to the claim that where the total wages of the
36. 179 S.E.2d 679, 683-85 (1970).
37. 179 S.E.2d 679, 683-84 (1970), citing St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v.
Idov, 88 Ga. App. 697, 77 S.E.2d 327, cert. dism. 210 Ga. 256, 78 S.E2d 799

(1953).
38. See footnote 31, Supra.
39. 63 Ariz. 264, 161 P.2d 113 (1945).
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employee are added together and imposed upon the particular employer
in whose employ the employee was at the time of the accident, in

Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury,4 0 . . . the court said:
".. . There is undoubtedly an element of hardship in throwing the

entire burden upon the applicant (employer). The burden is, however, thrown upon it under the act by reason of the fact that the
' 41
employee was killed while in its service."

The court went on to state, by way of dictum, that it did not
think that one employer should ever be burdened with a
responsibility for compensation greater than that which would
have resulted had the injured employee been employed by him
"continuously at the usual and regular rates for the particular
42
services he was performing at the time of the accident."
In other words, the court felt that if an employee was injured
in his part-time job it would be acceptable to consider wages
from his full-time job, but only to the extent t*at the combination did not exceed the amount which the employee could have
earned from the part-time employer if he had been working
for such employer on a full-time basis. 43 This theory would

seem to imply that if the employee were injured in his fulltime employment, the wages earned in his part-time employment could not be considered.
In 1964 the Arizona Supreme Court, in Sanchez v. Industrial Commission,44 refused to allow the combination of wages
in a situation involving concurrent dissimilar employment,
and stated: "Any inference to the contrary arising out of
Wells v. IndustrialCommission... is specifically overruled." 4
Another basis for t~he decision in this case, in addition to the
dissimilarity of employments, was the fact that the concurrent
46
employer was not subject to the compensation act.
The year after the Sanchez case, the Arizona court was
faced with a situation involving concurrent dissimilar employment in which both employers were subject to the compensation act. In this case, Wesolowski v. IndustrialCommis40. 172 Cal. 407, 156 P. 491 (1916).
41. 63 Ariz. 264, 270-71, 161 P.2d 113, 115-16 (1945), quoting in part from
Butler v. Industrial Comm., 50 Ariz. 516, 73 P.2d 705 (1939).
42. 63 Ariz. 264, 272, 161 P.2d 113, 116 (1945).
43. This theory is advocated by Justice Oxner, concurring in result, in

McCummings v. Anderson Theatre Co., 225 S.C. at 194, 81 S.E.2d at 351.
44. 96 Ariz. 19, 391 P.2d 579 (1964).
45. Id. at 23, 391 P.2d at 582.
46. Id.
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the court again refused to allow the wages to be combined. In neither the Sanchez case nor the Wesolowski case
did the court altempt to elaborate as to the logic or reasoning
behind their decision.
siony,4

The policy adopted by North Carolina with regard to
the combination of wages from concurrent employment is
particularly significant because of the fact that the North
Carolina statutory definition of "average weekly wages" is
substantially identical to the statutory definition in South
49
Carolina. 48 In the 1966 case of Barnhardtv. Yellow Cab Co.,
the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to allow the combination of wages for determining the "average weekly wage"
where the claimant worked full-time as a machine maintenance man and part-time as a taxicab driver. The claimant
was shot while driving his cab and was totally and permanently disabled.
The pertinent portions of North Carolina's statutory definition of "average weekly wages", as pointed out by the court,
are:
"Average Weekly Wages.-(1) 'Average weekly wages' shall mean
the earnings of the injured employee in the employment in which he
was working at the time of the injury during the period of fifty-two
weeks immediately preceding the date of the injury, . . . "(4) But
where for exceptional reasons the foregoing would be unfair, either
to the employer or employee, such other method of computing average
weekly wages may be resorted to as will most nearly approximate the
amount which the injured employee would be earning were it not for

the injury."Go

The North Carolina court recognized that the facts in
this case were indistinguishable from those in the South Carolina case of MeCummings v. Anderson Theatre Co., referred
to in the Introduction to this note,5' and recognized that the
applicable statutory provisions of the two states were identical. The court, however, concluded that McCummings, as has
47. 99 Ariz. 4, 405 P.2d 889 (1965).
48. Compare N.C. GEN. LAWS ch. 97 §97-2(5) (Supp. 1971) with S.C.
CoDE ANN. §72-4 (Supp. 1970).
49. 266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966).
50. 266 N.C. 419, 421-22, 146 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1966), citing N.C. GEN.
LAWS ch. 97 §97-2(5) (1963). The paragraph numbers were supplied by
the court and are not found in the statute.
51. See note 7 supra.
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been pointed out, "is not authority for any method of comput5' 2
ing average weekly wages under any circumstances.
In spite of the fact that the South Carolina court specifi-

cally refused to give precedential value to the method of computing the average weekly wage used in McCummings, it is

interesting to note that the decision in that case, allowing
wages to be combined, was based on the portion of South

Carolina's statute which is identical to paragraph (4) of the
North Carolina statute, set out above. 53 The North Carolina
court, however, felt that paragraph (4) was limited by the
words "in the employment in which he was working at the
time of the injury" found in paragraph (1). In justifying

this statutory interpretation, the court stated:
It is frequently said that the Workmen's Compensation Act must
be liberally construed to accomplish the humane purpose for which it
was passed, i.e., compensation for injured employees. The purpose of
the Act, however, is not only to provide a swift and certain remedy to
an injured workman, but also to insure a limited and determinate
liability for employers....
It seems reasonable to us that the Legislature, having placed the
economic loss caused by a workman's injury upon the employer for
whom he was working at the time of the injury, would also relate
the amount of that loss to the average weekly wages which that employer was paying the employee. Plaintiff, of course, will greatly
benefit if his wages from both jobs are combined; but, if this is done,
Cab Company and its carrier, which has not received a commensurate
premium, will be required to pay him a higher weekly compensation
benefit than Cab Company ever paid him in wages. Whether an employer pays this benefit directly from accumulated reserves, or indirectly in the form of higher premiums, to combine plaintiff's wages
from his two employments would not be fair to the employer. Method
(4), "while it prescribes no precise method for computing 'average
weekly wages,' sets up a standard to which results fair and just to both
parties must be related." 5 4

The Barnhardt court did not, however, seem convinced
that the policy which they felt their statute demanded was
necessarily the best policy. The opinion recognized "the potential plight of all workers who are concurrently engaged

in more than one employment" and stated: "It is tragic indeed that plaintiff should be thus victimized by his diligence

and his ambition to provide for his own-particularly since,
52. 266 N.C. 419, 425, 146 S.E.2d 479, 483 (1966).
53. 225 S.C. 187, 192, 81 S.E.2d 348, 349-50 (1954).
54. 266 N.C. at 427, 146 S.E.2d at 484-85.
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in our society, voluntary idleness is frequently compensated.
Only the Legislature, however, can remedy this condition."5 5
Further evidence of the North Carolina Supreme Court's
attitude is found in Joyner v. A. J. Carey Oil Co., 56 decided
the same day Barnhardtwas decided. Here the court stated:
When an employee who holds two separate jobs is injured in one of
them, his compensation is based only upon his average weekly wages
earned in the employment producing the injury. This case and
Barnhardt point out a hiatus in our Workmen's Compensation Act
which the Legislature may wish to bridge to prevent future duplication
57
of these unhappy results.

In spite of the prevalence of the "concurrent similar

employment doctrine," there are states which allow the combination of wages regardless of "similarity." One such state
is Massachusetts. In In Re Quebec,58 a 1923 case, the Massachusetts court decided that under the compensation statute in
effect at that time wages from concurrent employment could
not be combined in determining the average weekly wage.
The Massachusetts statute was subsequently amended, however, and it now provides, in pertinent part:
In case the injured employee is employed in the concurrent service of
more than one insured employer or self-insurer, his total earnings from
the several insured employers and self-insurers shall be considered in
determining his average weekly wages. 5 9

In 1956, the provision was interpreted as allowing the combi-

nation of wages in either similar or dissimilar employment. 60
California's workmen's compensation statute provides in
part:
(b)Employment by two or more employers. Where the employee is
working for two or more employers at or about the time of the injury,
the average weekly earnings shall be taken as 95 percent of the aggregate of such earnings from all employments computed in terms of
one week; but the earnings from employments other than the employment in which the injury occurred shall not be taken at a higher rate
than the hourly rate paid at the time of the injury.6 1
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

266 N.C. 419, 429, 146 S.E.2d 479, 486 (1966).
266 N.C. 519, 146 S.E.2d 447 (1966).
Id. at 521, 146 S.E.2d at 449.
247 Mass. 80, 141 N.E. 532 (1923).
AwN. LAWS OF MASS. ch. 152, §1 (1957).
In Re Nelson, 333 Mass. 401, 131 N.E.2d 193 (1956).
WEST CAL. LABOR CODE 453 (b) (West 1971).
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Pennsylvania's workmen's compensation law also allows
the combination of wages but requires knowledge by the defendant employer of the concurrent employment. The applicable portion of the statute states:
Where the employee is working under
two or more employers and the defendant
of such employment prior to the accident,
employers shall be considered as if earned
62
for compensation.

concurrent contracts with
employer has knowledge
his wages from all such
from the employer liable

It is interesting to note that the original version of the Pennsylvania statute, enacted in 1915, did not require that the defendant employer have knowledge of the concurrent employment. 63 The state of Maine also allows the consideration of
64
all wages earned in concurrent employment.
III.

CONCLUSION

Regardless of whether the solution lies within the province of the judiciary or the province of the legislature, the
problem is the same, i.e., by what standard should an employee
engaged in concurrent dissimilar employment be compensated?
One thing seems clear. There is no valid reason for the
distinction between similar and dissimilar employment. In
either situation, if the insured employer or self-insurer, in
whose employ the employee is injured, is forced to compensate
the employee on a basis of combined wages, an injustice results to the insurer. On the other hand, if wages are not combined, the results will often be extremely unjust to the employee. Who can best withstand the effects of the injustice?
The only reasonable conclusion is that in the vast majority
of cases it is with the insurance company or self-insured employer that the burden can most comfortably be carried.
The policy of requiring knowledge by the employer of
the concurrent employment appears on the surface to be reasonable and fair to both sides. It would seem, however, that
this policy could lead to the situation where a person, employed on a full-time basis, would have a difficult time finding part-time work, unless he did not inform his prospective
employer of his full-time job, thereby effectively waiving his
62. 77 PA. STAT. ANN. §582 (Supp. 1971).
63. 77 PA. STAT. ANN. §582 Historical Note.
64. SCHNMIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT §2259 (e),

citing Juan's

Case, 125 Me. 350, 134 A. 161 (1926).
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rights to "full" compensation. The desirability of this possible result is questionable.
It is hoped by this writer that if the question of combining wages is again brought up in South Carolina, the South
Carolina Supreme Court will not be persuaded by the statutory interpretation promulgated by the North Carolina court
in the Barnhardt6" case, but rather that it will give precedential value to the theory on which McCummings66 was
decided.
HERBERT THOMAS McINTOSH, JR.

65. 266 N.C. 419, 146 S.E.2d 479 (1966).
66. 225 S.C. 187, 81 S.E.2d 348 (1954).
As pointed out earlier, note 8, supra, the combination of wages in
the McCninings case was based on the following portion of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Law:
But when for exceptional reasons the foregoing would be unfair,
either to the employer or employee, such other method of computing average weekly wages may be resorted to as will most
nearly approximate the amount which the injured employee
would be earning were it not for the injury. S.C. CODE ANN.
§72-4 (1970).
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